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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the underdeveloped field of experimental philosophy 
of science. We examine variability in the philosophical views of scientists. 
Using data from Toolbox Dialogue Initiative, we analyze scientists’ responses 
to prompts on philosophical issues (methodology, confirmation, values, reality, 
reductionism, and motivation for scientific research) to assess variance in the 
philosophical views of physical scientists, life scientists, and social and 
behavioral scientists. We find six prompts about which differences arose, with 
several more that look promising for future research. We then evaluate the 
difference between the natural and social sciences and the challenge of 
interdisciplinary integration across scientific branches. 
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1 Introduction 
Experimental philosophy has made great strides in several areas, including epistemology and 
ethics, but one area that has received less attention is philosophy of science. Of the scant 
experimental philosophy of science produced so far, the focus has been primarily on specific 
scientific concepts, entities, or properties, such as genes (Stotz, Griffiths, and Knight 2004; 
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Griffiths and Stotz 2008) or innateness (Griffitsh, Machery, and Linquist 2009; Knobe and 
Samuels 2013). (For a review, see (Machery 2016).) Already a clarion call has sounded for 
more experimental work in philosophy of science (Stotz 2009b, 2009a; Weinberg and Crowley 
2009; Nagatsu 2013; Machery 2016). We concur and also believe that the scope of this work 
should be extended. To these ends, we endeavor to develop and extend experimental 
philosophy of science by engaging in philosophical cartography. Using data gathered by the 
Toolbox Dialogue Initiative (TDI),1 we attempt to illuminate some of the general contours of a 
map of the philosophical attitudes of practicing scientists and then use this map to contribute 
to current work in the philosophy of science on interdisciplinary integration.  
An experimentally informed map of philosophical attitudes of scientists is 
philosophically interesting for several reasons. First, distinguishing between the natural and 
social sciences has been a topic of discussion in philosophy of science for decades now. Ian 
Hacking (1996), for example, offers a complex distinction between the two, claiming that the 
classificatory practices of the social sciences interact with the world in a way not found in the 
natural sciences. Call something an electron and it makes no differences to it; diagnosing 
people with narcissism can change how they behave. (For more on Hacking’s proposal, see 
(Martínez 2009).) Developing a map of the philosophical attitudes of scientists can inform 
projects like Hacking’s. For instance, if the classificatory practices of the social and natural 
                                               
1 Formerly the Toolbox Project (http://tdi.msu.edu/). 
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sciences work as Hacking proposes, we should expect social scientists to have more antirealist 
sympathies than natural scientists. This is a testable prediction. If it were to bear out, and thus 
make an appearance on our collective map of scientists’ philosophical attitudes, Hacking’s 
proposal would gain a consideration in its favor. In this paper, we develop the beginnings of 
such a map. We do so experimentally by basing our claims on a survey of scientists’ own 
reports of their attitudes regarding various issues, rather than by appeal to our own intuitions 
or a philosophical analysis of the literatures of various sciences. This survey-driven approach 
allows us to capture heterogeneity across different areas of sciences, something that can elude 
traditional intuition- and literature-based methods in philosophy of science (Faust and Meehl 
2002; Griffiths and Stotz 2008; Machery and Cohen 2012; Steel, Gonnerman, and O’Rourke 
2017).2 
Second, experimental examination of scientists’ philosophical attitudes opens a new 
avenue into the existing discussion of interdisciplinary integration in philosophy of science. 
One prominent focus of philosophers of science has been on integration as a relation between 
various scientific objects, such as theories, fields, or specialties (Bechtel 1993; Darden and 
                                               
2 The traditional literature-based methods that we have in mind are ones where the 
philosopher engages very deeply with a subset of the scientific literature, especially literature 
which she deems relevant and read in depth. As Machery (2016) explains, bibliometric and 
cliometric techniques provide philosophers with other ways of exploring scientific literatures.  
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Maull 1977; Gerson 2013; Grantham 2004; Griesemer 2013). Nagel’s (1961)reductionist 
account of scientific theories can be seen as an early entry into this literature. More recently, 
as skepticism has grown about this reductive project, some (Mitchell et al. 1997; Brigandt 
2013; Love 2008) have proposed a non-reductive conception of integration according to which 
the ideas and explanations of various disciplines are integrated “to yield an overall explanation 
of a complex phenomenon” (Brigandt 2010, 297).  
Drawing inputs from different disciplines provides reason to believe that integration of 
this sort is distinctly philosophical in character (O’Rourke, Crowley, and Gonnerman 2016). 
Disciplines engage with the world in different ways, foregrounding certain problems while 
leaving others in the background. This sort of engagement can be modeled in terms of a 
discipline’s research worldview, comprised of a system of core beliefs, values, and practices 
(O’Rourke and Crowley 2013). These worldviews differ in various ways, such as in the 
meaning of terms used to articulate them (Bracken and Oughton 2006; S. M. Donovan, 
O’Rourke, and Looney 2015). The task of interdisciplinary integration typically requires 
combining inputs that reflect these worldviews, and differences among worldviews can 
complicate this task, especially since they can be fundamental and hard to see. As Eigenbrode 
et al. explain, “Scientists collaborating within disciplines tend to share fundamental 
assumptions and values concerning the scientific process and, habitually, may discuss them 
little, but the failure to understand and address these fundamental differences can impede 
progress in cross-disciplinary efforts” (2007, 56). Since the fundamental assumptions that 
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compose disciplinary worldviews are partly metaphysical and epistemological in nature 
(O’Rourke and Crowley 2013), philosophy can contribute to studies of interdisciplinarity 
integration by investigating these assumptions. By experimentally examining philosophical 
commitments or attitudes of practicing scientists, we gain a better understanding of the nature, 
mechanisms, and challenges of integration in interdisciplinary science.  
This study explores a large data set generated by TDI (Eigenbrode et al. 2007; S. M. 
Donovan, O’Rourke, and Looney 2015). Since 2005, over 250 TDI (or “Toolbox”) workshops 
have been conducted worldwide to enhance mutual understanding, communication, and 
collaboration among members of interdisciplinary groups. After canvassing several issues in 
experimental philosophy of science in section 2, we offer detailed descriptions of these 
Toolbox workshops and the data they generate in section 3. In section 4 we present of our 
results. Then in section 5 we discuss those results, emphasizing what they mean for the 
distinction between the natural and the social sciences and for the challenge of interdisciplinary 
integration in the sciences.  
2 Experimental philosophy of science 
Our initial step toward developing experimental philosophy of science involves defending the 
validity and effectiveness of empirical methods in philosophy of science. Experimental 
philosophy is a recent and growing movement that employs the systematic collection and 
analysis of empirical data as means for philosophical investigation. A central tenet of this 
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movement is that philosophical arguments often make, entail, or presuppose empirical claims, 
and, as such, the strength of these arguments can be judged, in part, by collecting and analyzing 
empirical data that bear on those claims. Experimental philosophers have moved into a wide 
range of philosophical debates in metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology (Knobe et al. 2012; 
Sytsma and Livengood 2015; Machery 2017). Yet almost ironically, the field of experimental 
philosophy of science has received little development (Machery 2016). 
Stotz (2009a, 2009b) and Weinberg and Crowley (2009) outline some of the basic 
theoretical motivations for experimental philosophy of science. They assert that philosophy of 
science should be informed by how scientists conceive of and practice science. For this 
reason—as most contemporary philosophers would agree—philosophy of science that is 
conducted purely “from the armchair” with little awareness of actual scientists, scientific 
practices, and scientific findings is, at least prima facie, of dubious value. In our view, this 
common starting point for much of contemporary philosophy of science paves the way for the 
use of empirical data in philosophy of science. 
The idea that philosophy of science can profit from empirical data about science is 
hardly novel. It is exemplified in the work of those who take what Bird (2008) calls “the 
historical turn in the philosophy of science.” We also see it in works that use case studies to 
advance philosophical claims about science or its areas such as biology. A central distinction 
between experimental philosophy of science and these approaches, however, is the proposal 
that philosophy of science can also benefit from empirical analysis about how scientists think 
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and behave. As Thagard notes, “Science is a human enterprise, and understanding the 
development of scientific knowledge depends on an account of the thought processes of 
humans” (1988, 4). A central focus of experimental philosophy of science, then, should be the 
systematic collection and analysis of empirical data pertaining to scientific thought processes 
and practices. And where the existing empirical record about how scientists think and behave 
is too thin, philosophers should feel free to gather the data themselves, using appropriate 
methods, of course, and possibly in collaboration with practicing scientists.3 
In addition to data regarding the views and practices of actual scientists, another source 
of data could be relevant. Feist notes that “Scientific thought and behavior are not limited to 
scientists per se but also encompass thought processes of children, adolescents, and adults who 
are simulating scientific problem solving and developing mental models of how the world 
works” (Fiest 2006, 4). Experimental philosophy can gather and interpret data from either 
                                               
3 Work exists in nearby orbits, such as the cognitive sciences of science (Carruthers, 
Stich, and Siegal 2002; Proctor and Capaldi 2012; Feist and Gorman 2013). Some of this work 
draws philosophical conclusions about science from empirical data, systematically collected 
and analyzed (Grover 1981; Houts 1989; Wagenknecht, Nersessian, and Andersen 2015). For 
us, such work qualifies as experimental philosophy of science, even if the researchers don’t 
use the term. 
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trained scientists or ordinary folk without specialized scientific training. This difference in data 
source corresponds to the difference between experimental philosophy of science narrowly or 
broadly construed. Both kinds of research are represented in what little experimental 
philosophy of science currently exists. As examples of narrow experimental philosophy of 
science, Stotz et al. (2004) and Griffiths and Stotz (2008) examine scientists’ conceptions of 
genes. Griffiths et al. (2009) and Linquist et al. (2011), alternatively, engage in a broader form 
of experimental philosophy of science by examining views on innateness and human nature 
(respectively) held by non-scientists. Knobe and Samuels (2013) combine the two by 
examining the views on innateness held by both scientists and non-scientists.  
In all of these manifestations, the commitment of experimental philosophy of science 
to the relevance of empirical data is fundamentally naturalistic. Despite debate about its details, 
the naturalist idea that the methods of philosophy are of a piece with the methods of science 
figures importantly into the background of these views (Papineau 2009; Hartner 2013). That 
experimental philosophy of science is naturalistic should come as no surprise; what might be 
surprising, though, is the claim that philosophical aspects of science should be sensitive to data 
on the attitudes of scientists, including their philosophical attitudes. We contend that, without 
these data, philosophical claims about, for example, the roles of values in science or the 
epistemic standing of various methods will ignore a critical determinant of how values inflect 
actual scientific judgments, decisions, and behaviors and how methods are selected in 
examining specific research questions (Steel, Gonnerman, and O’Rourke 2017). To some 
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extent, data about these philosophical attitudes may be gleaned from a close acquaintance with 
scientists and their publications. But any such acquaintance is likely to be non-systematic and 
non-representative, thereby providing an insufficient basis from which to draw philosophical 
conclusions about science (Faust and Meehl 2002; Griffiths and Stotz 2008; Machery and 
Cohen 2012). A better way to uncover these attitudes is to deploy experimental methods, 
especially those of the social sciences. Of course, experimentally examining the philosophical 
attitudes of practicing scientists (specifically those relevant to philosophical reasoning about 
science) does not entail that philosophers should defer to the philosophical perspectives of 
scientists. Rather, the success of experimental philosophy of science requires combining 
appreciation for conceptual dimensions of science with details about how science actually 
works. 
3 Method 
We seek to expand experimental philosophy of science by engaging in it, specifically by 
experimentally probing for philosophical differences among scientific branches by examining 
the philosophical commitments of scientists who belong to those branches. To do this, we 
looked at 43 Toolbox workshops that were conducted with interdisciplinary research teams.4 
These workshops were conducted between March 2009 and October 2013; they had 346 
                                               
4 Dataset available online: 
https://mfr.osf.io/render?url=https://osf.io/ytpnw/?action=download%26mode=render 
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participants (127 female), who ranged from graduate students to senior researchers with over 
twenty years of research experience. 
At the start of these workshops, participants receive the STEM (Science-Technology-
Engineering-Mathematics) Toolbox instrument, which consists of six modules focusing on 
scientifically relevant philosophical issues and concludes with a page asking for demographic 
data. Each module contains four to five related prompts, 28 total (Looney et al. 2013)5 in 
response to which participants either report agreement or disagreement on a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (Disagree) to 5 (Agree) or select “Don’t know” or “N/A.”6 These last two 
options allow participants alternate responses to the Likert scale, thereby minimizing artificial 
clustering around the midpoint of the scale for cases of ignorance or non-applicability. The 
demographic page includes four numbered spaces in which participants are asked to describe 
their disciplinary “identity.” By analyzing participants’ self-reported disciplinary identity in 
                                               
5 Full instrument available at https://goo.gl/g2gS7q 
6 Each module concludes with a “similar views” prompt, which asks participants to 
evaluate how similar the views among the group are for that module. We have excluded these 
prompts from the present analysis.  
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conjunction with their responses to these prompts, as we explain in section 4, we can look for 
philosophical differences across branches of science.7 
Two preliminary tasks were required before searching the data for philosophical 
differences. First, we needed to assign participants to academic disciplines. We began by 
examining the discipline(s) listed on the demographics page. Since these responses were open-
ended, there was considerable variability in the discipline(s) listed. Some provided a single 
discipline; others gave several. Some responded quite generally (e.g., "biology"), while others 
responded very specifically (e.g., "fluvial geomorphology"). The question was how to 
categorize participants into disciplines and larger academic branches (groups of disciplines, 
such as Engineering, Arts & Humanities, and Life Sciences) given this variability. This 
                                               
7 Workshops start with a preamble from the workshop facilitator (a TDI member), 
followed by participants completing a Toolbox instrument. They then engage in a semi-
structured dialogue based on the prompts, with the goal of helping them to see their common 
research problem through each other’s eyes (Looney et al. 2013). After the dialogue, 
participants complete the instrument a second time to assess how their views may have shifted 
during the dialogue. For this study, we only examined the pre-dialogue responses, since our 
goal is to explore the philosophical attitudes of scientists taken as representatives of their 
disciplines, which we take to be better represented by their attitudes prior to the Toolbox 
dialogue. 
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presented two challenges: selecting a disciplinary taxonomy to use in assigning participants to 
disciplines and interpreting participant responses in light of that taxonomy. 
For the first challenge, we selected the Digital Commons Three-Tiered Taxonomy of 
Academic Disciplines (Bepress 2014) because the large degree of categorical resolution it 
offered made it easier to accommodate the wide variety of disciplinary self-identifications 
reported by workshop participants. The Digital Commons taxonomy is regularly updated based 
on user feedback and developed using entries from multiple sources, such as The University 
of California’s list of departments and the Taxonomy of Research Doctoral Programs from the 
National Academies. At the time of analysis, the Digital Commons taxonomy comprised over 
900 unique disciplinary categories broken into three tiers that we’ll refer to as academic 
branches, disciplines, and specializations. To illustrate, Philosophy is a discipline in the 
academic branch of Arts and Humanities, with specializations including Metaphysics, Feminist 
Philosophy, and Philosophy of Science. (The Digital Commons taxonomy’s third tier of 
specializations was especially useful for interpreting highly specific disciplinary identifications 
employed by Toolbox participants in their disciplinary self-identifications.) The top-tier of 
academic branches for the Digital Commons taxonomy consists of the following categories: 
Architecture, Arts and Humanities, Business, Education, Engineering, Law, Life Sciences, 
Medicine & Health Sciences, Physical Sciences & Mathematics, and Social & Behavioral 
Sciences. For this paper, we focused only on those researchers in the scientific branches: Life 
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Sciences, Physical Sciences & Mathematics, and Social & Behavioral Sciences. As explained 
below, our focus on these branches was in part due to the number of participants in each branch.  
The second challenge concerned interpreting participants’ disciplinary self-
identifications in light of the Digital Commons taxonomy, a task complicated by demographic 
pages often containing multiple disciplinary specifications. In describing their disciplinary 
identity, most participants (276 of 346, 82.1%) provided at least two disciplines, such as “(1) 
algorithmics (2) microbial ecology (3) discrete math.” For the sake of categorizing participants 
into academic branches and disciplines, we only looked at the first discipline reported for two 
reasons. First, we are interested in researcher’s primary disciplinary identity, and we operated 
on the assumption that participants entered this discipline first. Second, it was not possible to 
look beyond the first discipline for everyone, since 17.9% participants only listed one 
discipline. We thus opted to err on the side of caution by abstaining from drawing on secondary 
disciplines listed to inform judgments about disciplinary identity.  
After meeting the challenges associated with the first preliminary task, we turned to the 
second, which was to clarify the nature of the differences that could be revealed by the STEM 
Toolbox instrument. This task was complicated by the number of dimensions of potential 
difference that the instrument was designed to reveal. The STEM instrument includes prompts 
such as “Objectivity implies an absence of values by the researcher,” and “Validation of 
evidence requires replication.” It was designed in an explicitly philosophical fashion, with half 
of its prompts classified as epistemological and half as metaphysical (Eigenbrode et al. 2007; 
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O’Rourke and Crowley 2013). The epistemology prompts are divided into those that concern 
a scientist’s motivation for participating in research, those that concern the methods used in 
conducting research, and those that concern identifying when conclusions have been reached. 
The metaphysics prompts are organized into those that concern the nature of reality, the 
structure of reality (and in particular, reductionism and emergence), and values.8 
The STEM instrument’s prompts also distinguish between how scientists view their 
own work and how they view science more broadly. In doing so, the prompts help isolate 
important determinants of a scientist’s identity and place them in the context of a broader 
construal of scientific practice. Of the 28 prompts that we examine, 8 are reflexive prompts 
that express characteristics that some regard as fundamental to their own research (e.g., “My 
research typically isolates the behavior of individual components of a system”), and 20 are 
prompts that are not limited to one’s own research. Of these 20 prompts, the context of 
interpretation varies. For example, two focus specifically on cross-disciplinary research, six 
use the adjective ‘scientific’ explicitly to frame interpretation, and five explicitly mention 
research without modifying it with ‘scientific’. The balance talk about aspects of research 
without mentioning a context. Since this instrument is called the “Scientific Research Toolbox 
                                               
8 The values prompts reflect concerns with values in science, and so address 
axiological or value-theoretic concerns. See Eigenbrode et al. (2007) for why these were 
included in the Metaphysics half of the instrument. 
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Instrument” and is deployed in workshop settings with interdisciplinary science teams, the 
expectation is that the participants will interpret the 20 non-reflexive prompts as pertaining to 
research that is scientific and that extends beyond one’s own practice.  
Thematically, the eight reflexive prompts address aspects of science and scientific 
research practices that apply across multiple research projects, such as the methods one 
primarily uses or the ontological character of one’s subject matter, with one prompt addressing 
the collective project of the workshop participants (viz., “The importance of our project stems 
from its applied aspects”). The 20 remaining prompts are more heterogeneous. Some offer 
provocative analyses of concepts that some take to be central to science, such as objectivity or 
advocacy. A second group orients workshop participants to certain visions of scientific 
explanation and scientific practice (e.g., “Value-neutral scientific research is possible”). 
Additional prompts express views about what must be true for a practice to count as science 
(e.g., “Scientific research must be hypothesis driven”), while still others address the values of 
particular scientists (e.g., “The principal value of research stems from the potential application 
of the knowledge gained”). This set of 20 prompts is unified in reflecting different ways of 
thinking about science, including its structure and function. 
In indicating their agreement or disagreement with each prompt, participants reveal (in 
some cases perhaps only indirectly) how they practice science or how they think science should 
be practiced. All the prompts (but one) abstract away from specific research contexts and 
projects, allowing participants to understand them in the context of science as they practice it 
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and view it. In responding to them, participants are asked to adopt the primary disciplinary 
perspective they assume in their research, and because of this, the responses can be understood 
as articulating commitments that frame one’s research approach, either affirmatively or 
negatively.9 Together, the STEM instrument’s prompts can be seen as partly mapping an 
investigator’s research worldview (or at least the more cognitive aspects of it), which may be 
understood as a set of “more or less tacit beliefs held by researchers about what they are 
studying and how to study it, as well as views about the nature of the output of their 
inquiry”(O’Rourke and Crowley 2013, 1938). When taken together, the maps that emerge for 
workshop participants display the topography of agreement and disagreement across a range 
                                               
9 This instruction is motivated by the fact that many participants have complex 
disciplinary identities that could issue in different responses to the prompts, depending on 
which part of their identity is emphasized. (See the discussion above of the disciplines listed 
on the demographic page.) The workshop facilitator delivers the instruction in the workshop 
preamble as it is articulated in the text in order to provide consistent guidance to participants 
in responding to the prompts. Despite this instruction, over the next couple sections, we 
assume that workshop participants interpret the broader science prompts as claims about 
scientific research in general; however, an anonymous referee helpfully pointed out that they 
could interpret them as more localized claims about their own particular kinds of scientific 
research, e.g., social scientific research or natural scientific research. In the Discussion 
section, we respond to this concern. 
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of philosophical issues that some view as fundamental to scientific inquiry and that illuminate 
aspects of a scientist’s identity. Each map is systematic but skeletal, highlighting a few 
attitudes about the philosophical dimensions of science, sometimes fairly directly (as in the 
broader prompts about science) and sometimes more indirectly (as in the reflexive prompts). 
More technically, the prompts elicit, directly or indirectly, commitments about the 
metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological dimensions of science that often frame how 
one understands and practices science.  
4 Results 
Using participant self-reports of disciplinary identity, two of the authors served as raters to 
categorize participants into academic branches, using the Digital Commons Three-Tiered 
Taxonomy of Academic Disciplines (Bepress 2014)10 The two raters first agreed to exclude 9 
participants for providing responses that were clearly not research disciplines (such as “grant 
administration”). After independently coding an academic branch for each participant, the two 
raters then compared their results. Cohen’s Kappa determined a relatively high degree of 
correspondence (k = 0.82), with the raters differing on 54 participants (out of 346). Of these, 
                                               
10 The raters also coded and compared academic disciplines as well as academic 
branches. The raters agreed on 75% of cases, but there were too many disciplines (many of 
which were represented by only a few participants) to allow for statistical analysis. 
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they resolved their disagreement for all but 13 participants, who were then excluded from 
further analysis. 11 The results are summarized in Table 1.  
Life Sciences (LS) 134 
Physical Sciences & Mathematics (PSM) 72 
Social & Behavioral Sciences (SBS) 58 
Engineering  34 
Medicine and Health Sciences  17 
Arts and Humanities  8 
Education  10 
Business  2 
Table 1. Summary of participants’ academic branches as determined by two raters.  
As Table 1 indicates, Life Sciences (LS), Physical Sciences & Mathematics (PSM), 
and Social & Behavioral Sciences (SBS) were well represented among Toolbox participants. 
Since we are interested in differences among scientific branches, we focused our attention on 
participants in these three fields, excluding participants from other academic fields from 
analysis. This left us with 264 participants (95 female). 
For our analysis, we ran the Kruskal–Wallis rank sum test for each of the 28 Toolbox 
prompts.12 To contextualize this test, for each prompt, each of the three scientific branches had 
                                               
11 In each of these cases, the raters agreed that the difference was intractable and both 
interpretations were plausible. For instance, one participant self-identified as “neurobiology,” 
which the raters agreed could either be Life Sciences or Medicine and Health Sciences. 
12 Since our data are not normally distributed, we did not run a series of ANOVAs.  
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a median score. The Kruskal–Wallis test examines the three medians for each prompt for 
significant differences. The null hypothesis is that the medians are equal (i.e., MdnLS = MdnPSM 
= MdnSBS). The test includes a calculation of the probability (the p-value reported below) of the 
observed results (or more extreme results), given the null hypothesis. If the probability is low 
enough, then we reject the null hypothesis, meaning that at least one median of the three is 
significantly different than the others. A follow-up test reveals which median(s) is different. If, 
however, the probability is not sufficiently low, the null hypothesis is not rejected, indicating 
that responses to this prompt are statistically indistinguishable across the three academic 
branches. The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test for each prompt are summarized in Table 2.13  
Prompt n df H p Prompt n df H p 
Motivation 1 257 2 2.02 0.37 Reality 1 256 2 11.32 3.48 x 10-3 
Motivation 2 252 2 6.25 0.04 Reality 2* 243 2 13.08 1.45 x 10-3 
Motivation 3 253 2 8.79 0.01 Reality 3 256 2 2.17 0.34 
Motivation 4 258 2 0.75 0.69 Reality 4* 237 2 35.41 2.05 x 10-8 
Methodology 1 263 2 10.45 5.38 x10-3 Values 1 256 2 1.45 0.48 
Methodology 2* 258 2 17.19 1.85 x 10-4 Values 2 260 2 5.07 0.08 
Methodology 3* 255 2 26.19 2.05 x 10-6 Values 3 252 2 10.90 4.29 x 10-3 
Methodology 4* 256 2 43.86 2.99 x 10-10 Values 4 246 2 5.41 0.07 
Methodology 5 257 2 2.76 0.25 Values 5 243 2 0.41 0.81 
Confirmation 1 254 2 4.79 0.09 Reductionism 1 220 2 6.64 0.04 
Confirmation 2 251 2 1.36 0.51 Reductionism 2 248 2 2.59 0.27 
Confirmation 3* 260 2 18.44 9.91 x 10-5 Reductionism 3 250 2 1.42 0.49 
                                               
13 For each prompt, we excluded “I don’t know” or “N/A” responses. As is apparent in 
the n column of Table 2, typically few participants were excluded, ranging from only 6 to 44 
(out of 264 total). 
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Confirmation 4 252 2 2.52 0.28 Reductionism 4 256 2 6.65 0.04 
Confirmation 5 255 2 3.41 0.18 Reductionism 5 256 2 6.14 0.05 
Table 2. Results from Kruskal–Wallis tests for each of the Toolbox prompts. Prompts marked 
with asterisks (*) are significant after applying the Holm-Bonferroni method for correcting for 
familywise error.  
Because the STEM instrument was not designed to detect particular differences, we 
should be mindful of the familywise error rate associated with multiple testing. In effect, we 
are not testing a single hypothesis, but rather 28 hypotheses simultaneously. The danger in 
testing multiple hypotheses simultaneously is that it increases the probability of a false 
positive—a Type I error. When testing a single hypothesis, the threshold for a significant p-
value is often set at 0.05, representing a 5% chance for a Type I error. If, however, the same 
threshold of 0.05 were applied separately for each of the 28 tests here, then the familywise 
error rate (i.e., the likelihood of at least one false positive) is approximately 0.74. So some 
form of correction is called for; we employed the Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm 1979), 
which is a stepwise algorithm that lowers the p-value required to reject a null hypothesis. Using 
this method, we find significant results for six of the prompts (marked with an asterisk in Table 
2): Methodology 2, Methodology 3, Methodology 4, Confirmation 3, Reality 2, and Reality 4. 
Three additional prompts were very close to significant after correction: Reality 1, 
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Methodology 1, and Values 3.14 Since the Holm-Bonferroni method is a fairly conservative 
means of correcting for familywise error, we have included these three for follow-up analysis 
along with the other six. But these results in particular should be taken tentatively. 
The Kruskal–Wallis tests found significant or nearly significant differences among the 
three branches of science for nine prompts. To determine where the differences reside, for each 
of these prompts we conducted follow-up analyses using the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon 
(MWW) test. This is a pairwise test, comparing the medians of two groups. In this case, for 
each prompt, three MWW tests are conducted, one for each comparison (LS and PSM, LS and 
SBS, and PSM and SBS). Results of all MWW tests for the nine prompts are summarized in 
Table 3 (Appendix). 
4.1 Reality 
For the Reality prompts, the initial Kruskal–Wallis tests found significant results for 
Reality 2 and 4, and Reality 1 was close. All of these results were borne out by the follow-up 
                                               
14 The p-values for each of these three prompts exceeded the threshold for significance 
set by the Holm-Bonferroni correction by less than 0.003. We therefore included these three 
prompts in our follow-up analyses, where we found significant differences across the 
scientific branches. These results should be taken tentatively and are included primarily to 
suggest future lines of research.  
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MWW tests (Figure 1). Researchers in Life Sciences and Physical Sciences & Mathematics 
were significantly were more likely to agree with Reality 1 (“Scientific research aims to 
identify facts about a world independent of the investigators”) than those in Social & 
Behavioral Sciences (LS & SBS: U = 4776.5, p = 9.52 x 10-04, r = 0.24 and PSM & SBS: U = 
2432.5, p = 0.03, r = 0.20). However, Life Sciences and Physical Sciences & Mathematics 
were not statistically distinguishable. For Reality 2 (“Scientific claims need not represent 
objective reality to be useful”), only between Life Sciences and Social & Behavioral Sciences 
was the difference statistically significant (U = 2364.5, p = 3.79 x 10-04, r = 0.26). As Figure 1 
shows, the mean for Physical Sciences & Mathematics was between the other two, although 
its differences with the other two branches were not statistically significant. For Reality 4 (“The 
subject of my research is a human construction”), life scientists and physical scientists and 
mathematicians were less willing to agree with this prompt than were social and behavioral 
scientists (LS & SBS: U = 1698.5, p = 2.70 x 10-09, r = 0.43 and PSM & LS: U = 875, p = 2.90 
x 10-06, r = 0.42). Again, Life Sciences and Physical Sciences & Mathematics were statistically 
indistinguishable, which is a pattern repeated below.  
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Figure 1.15 Summary of means by scientific branch for the Reality 1, 2, and 4 prompts  
4.2 Methodology 
Next we conducted follow-up analyses for Methodology 1 (“Scientific research (applied or 
basic) must be hypothesis driven”), Methodology 2 (“In my disciplinary research, I employ 
primarily quantitative methods”), Methodology 3 (“In my disciplinary research, I employ 
primarily qualitative methods”), and Methodology 4 (“In my disciplinary research, I employ 
primarily experimental methods”). Beginning with Methodology 1, life scientists and physical 
scientists and mathematicians were more willing to agree that science must be driven by 
                                               
15 All figures use the colorblind-friendly palette developed by Okabe & Ito (2002).  
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hypotheses than were social and behavioral scientists (U = 4949, p = 0.002, r = 0.22 and U = 
2627, p = 0.009, r = 0.23 respectively).16 Again, Life Sciences and Physical Sciences & 
Mathematics were statistically indistinguishable (Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Summary of means by scientific branch for the prompts Methodology 1-4.  
Methodology 2 and 3 concern quantitative and qualitative methods, respectively, and 
so can be discussed together. Both exhibit the previously observed pattern, where there is no 
significant difference between Life Sciences and Physical Sciences & Mathematics but both 
                                               
16 Recent qualitative analysis of Toolbox dialogues supports this point (Shannon M 
Donovan, O’Rourke, and Looney 2015). 
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differed from Social & Behavioral Sciences. Specifically, researchers in the Social & 
Behavioral Sciences are less inclined than researchers in the other two branches to employ 
quantitative methods (U = 5052, p = 1.10 x 10-04, r = 0.28 and U = 2648.5, p = 3.99 x 10-04, r = 
0.31) and more inclined to employ qualitative methods (U = 2109.5, p = 3.89 x 10-07, r = 0.36 
and U = 1170, p = 5.91 x 10-05, r = 0.35). Methodology 4 is the only prompt where all three 
branches are significantly different from one another. Life scientists were most likely to report 
employing experimental methods, followed by the physical scientists and mathematicians, and 
the social and behavioral scientists were the least likely to rely on experimentation.  
4.3 Confirmation and Values 
Finally, we consider the Confirmation and Values modules. Since only one prompt in each 
module was identified by the Kruskal–Wallis tests as requiring follow-up analysis, we present 
them together. As Figure 3 shows, the pattern of results is similar for these two prompts. 
Confirmation 3 (“Validation of evidence requires replication”) suggests that the demand for 
replication in the Social & Behavioral Sciences is significantly lower than in the Life Sciences 
(U = 5309.5, p = 1.42 x 10-05, r = 0.31) or Physical Sciences & Mathematics (U = 2656.5, p = 
0.002, r = 0.27). With respect to Values 3 (“Value-neutral scientific research is possible”), 
social and behavioral scientists were less willing to endorse the possibility of value-neutral 
science than life scientists (U = 4639, p = 0.002, r = 0.23) and physical scientists and 
mathematicians (U = 2586.5, p = 0.006, r = 0.24). Future research on this topic is particularly 
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recommended. In both cases, Life Sciences and Physical Sciences & Mathematics were 
statistically indistinguishable.  
Figure 3. Summary of means by scientific branch for the Confirmation 3 and Values 3 prompts.  
5 Discussion 
In this section, we dig more deeply into our results by first addressing a concern about how we 
interpret participants’ responses. We then turn to the project of distinguishing the natural and 
the social sciences. Finally, we consider the implications these results have for the ongoing 
conversation within philosophy of science about interdisciplinary integration. 
5.1 Addressing a methodological worry 
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As we adumbrated above, our strategy has been to probe for philosophical differences among 
scientific branches by examining the philosophical commitments or attitudes of scientists who 
belong to these branches, as indicated by their responses of agreement and disagreement with 
Toolbox prompts. For nine prompts, we have found reason to think that scientists in different 
branches tend to respond differently. We might be inclined to draw a number of immediate 
conclusions from these findings. For example, we might be inclined to say that social and 
behavioral scientists disagree with life scientists, physical scientists, and mathematicians about 
whether value-neutral scientific research is possible. However, for reasons raised by an 
anonymous referee and mentioned in note 11, we need to proceed slowly.  
For our four findings that involve reflexive prompts (viz., Methodology 2, 3, 4, and 
Reality 4), respondents are expressing attitudes about propositions that involve reference to 
themselves. In these cases, we cannot say that participants disagreed since the propositions to 
which they are responding differ. Nevertheless, we can note the differences. Social and 
behavioral scientists differ, for instance, to the extent to which they “employ primarily 
qualitative methods” in their disciplinary research. The remaining five prompts concern 
science understood more broadly, and so it is possible that representatives of the scientific 
branches disagree with one another about these, so long as they are interpreting the 
propositions in the same way, e.g., as claims about science in general. However, it might be 
that the participants are responding to the prompts in a way that reflects their particular 
scientific field, e.g., social science or natural science. So, a social scientist would interpret 
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Values 3 as a claim about value-neutral social science, whereas a physical scientist would 
interpret it as a claim about value-neutral natural science. In this case, the propositions differ, 
and so we could not conclude that different responses indicate disagreement.  
We acknowledge that for the five non-reflexive prompts that support branch-level 
differences, our data do not rule out the possibility that participants are interpreting them 
differently. We are, however, reasonably confident that the participants interpreted these 
prompts in a non-localized and more general way, for three reasons. First, before the Toolbox 
workshop, participants were asked to read (Eigenbrode et al. 2007), which places the Toolbox 
approach, and thereby the workshop, in the context of a wide range of possible scientific 
contributions to interdisciplinary research. Second, prior to responding to the prompts, 
participants heard a preamble from their workshop facilitator that motivates the workshop as a 
response to communication issues that arise in interdisciplinary collaborations involving 
representatives of potentially any subset of scientific disciplines. Third, typical workshops 
involve representatives of several disciplines. Often the disciplines are epistemically distant 
(e.g., sociology and microbiology). The preamble aims to make it clear that the dialogue is 
intended to highlight similarities and differences across the disciplines represented in the room. 
Considered together, these factors encourage an orientation on the part of the participant 
toward science in general, an orientation that it is reasonable to think carries over to the 
interpretation of the non-reflexive prompts.  
 30 
But, even if we are wrong and participants tended to interpret the non-reflexive prompts 
more locally, our principal conclusion about philosophical differences across scientific 
branches still holds. Although we are interested in whether or not the participants agree about 
the issues expressed by these prompts, our primary interest is in using our data to illuminate 
relationships among scientific branches. We maintain that this second broad conclusion 
follows whether the scientists involved tended to interpret the non-reflexive prompts in terms 
of science in general or their scientific fields in particular. To see this, assume first that the 
participating scientists tended to interpret the non-reflexive prompts in terms of science in 
general. Again, we found that a subset of these prompts gave rise to responses that tended to 
differ across scientific branches. On the current assumption, they are thus prompts give rise to 
cross-branch disagreements. This is a finding in need of an explanation. One reasonable 
explanation is that the disagreements stem from different views about science in general that 
reflect experiences of scientific branches that tend to differ in exactly these ways. On this 
assumption, what our results give us, then, is an indirect indication of what the Social & 
Behavioral Sciences, Life Sciences, and Physical Sciences & Mathematics are like.  
Now suppose that the previous assumption is wrong. Assume that the participating 
scientists tended to interpret the non-reflexive prompts in terms of their respective fields. This 
could be more general, like social science or natural science, or more specific, like sociology 
or physics. In this case, there is an even more direct path from their Toolbox responses to 
conclusions about their scientific branches. If social scientists say P about social science and 
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natural scientists say ~P about physical science, we should conclude that because social 
scientists are the best sources of insight into social science and natural scientists into physical 
science that P can be used to differentiate social science and natural science. Thus, either way, 
we are able to infer conclusions about their scientific branches from their Toolbox responses, 
which is the key conclusion we wish to draw from our data and the conclusion that will inform 
the rest of this Discussion section. 
5.2  A closer look 
There are a number of points to make about our results. First, they revealed little difference 
between Life Sciences and Physical Sciences & Mathematics. There was a statistically 
significant difference between them on only one prompt, Methodology 4. Otherwise, the two 
branches were indistinguishable. Only Social & Behavioral Sciences could be distinguished 
from one or both of the other scientific branches. On the assumption that Life Sciences and 
Physical Sciences & Mathematics qualify as natural sciences, differences like those reported 
here could help confirm philosophical accounts of what distinguishes the natural sciences from 
the social sciences. Consider Hacking’s account, introduced above. According to this account, 
the social sciences differ from the natural sciences because the classificatory practices of the 
social sciences interact with the world differently than the classificatory practices of the natural 
sciences. If this is true, then social scientists would have greater exposure than natural scientists 
to the makings of a prima facie consideration against one of the pillars of scientific realism—
the metaphysical claim that the sciences investigate a mind-independent world. As such, it 
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wouldn’t be too surprising to find social scientists more inclined toward antirealist attitudes 
about science than natural scientists. Our results with respect to Reality 1, 2, and 4 correspond 
to this expectation, thereby lending credence to Hacking’s theory. 
Further, our results provide some reason to think that Life Sciences and Physical 
Sciences & Mathematics are similar with respect to replication, value-neutrality, the role of 
hypotheses, and quantitative methods. Individually, these results are what we would expect—
that both would be more inclined to use quantitative rather than qualitative methods, for 
example—but taken together, they contribute to an increasingly detailed map of philosophical 
common ground they share with one another but not with the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 
and this helps motivate philosophical efforts to distinguish natural and social sciences. Further 
research is warranted to fill out this map, as well as explore where there might be philosophical 
differences between the two branches (e.g., the role of experimentation). 
A second point to make about our results stems from our finding that social and 
behavioral scientists were less willing to agree that value-neutral scientific research is possible 
(Values 3, M = 2.38, S = 1.40) than life scientists (M = 3.03, SD = 1.29) and physical scientists 
and mathematicians (M = 2.99, SD = 1.30). This difference might be due to a greater 
appreciation by scientists in the Social & Behavioral Sciences than in the other branches for 
the roles that values play in science—especially non-epistemic values. Such a hypothesis is a 
 33 
ripe topic for future research.17 This is not to say that there was widespread endorsement for the 
possibility of value-neutral science in the other branches; the means for both branches were 
very close to the midpoint of the scale.18 Nevertheless, as Steel et al. (2017) argue, the absence 
of an endorsement for value-neutral science suggests that philosophers of science should not 
assume, in building their normative theories about science or in developing their normative 
interventions for improving science, that scientists endorse the “value-free ideal,” according to 
which good science is science that is not influenced by non-epistemic human values (Douglas 
2009). 
Furthermore, on the reasonable assumption that many scientists understand value 
neutrality to be one form that scientific objectivity can take, our results suggest that further 
                                               
17 For related empirical work on this topic, see Reiners et al. (2013), who focus on 
values in ecology.  
18 If the participants do not know how to respond to the prompts or are uncertain, they 
can select the response option “Don’t Know”. Each module contained an additional prompt 
focusing on the similarity of the group’s views in that module (which we’ve omitted from 
analysis for this paper). For these prompts, 80 to 132 participants responded, “Don’t Know.” 
Additionally, for the Reductionism 1 prompt, 40 participants also responded, “Don’t Know.” 
The availability of this option and its regular use increases our confidence that means near 
the midpoint can be interpreted as “neither agree nor disagree.” 
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empirical study is warranted to investigate if scientists’ responses to issues related to scientific 
objectivity are mediated by their views on value-neutral science. This suggestion is motivated, 
in part, by Reiss and Sprenger (2016), who contend that:  
[m]any central debates in the philosophy of science have, in one way or another, 
to do with objectivity: confirmation and the problem of induction; theory choice 
and scientific change; realism; scientific explanation; experimentation; 
measurement and quantification; evidence and the foundations of statistics; 
evidence-based science; feminism and values in science.  
For example, as an initial conjecture, it might be that scientists who reject value-neutrality 
would be less likely to require replication for confirmation. After all, rejecting value-neutrality 
suggests an openness to methods for evaluating scientific research that are sensitive to value 
differences, and such methods could permit variation in acceptable results that is inconsistent 
with the replication standard.  
We note two caveats. First, our findings are preliminary and are based on a data set too 
small to provide resolution at the level of individual scientific disciplines. Given this limitation, 
it remains possible that the philosophical views of scientists correlate with scientific disciplines 
and we missed this, detecting only occasional correlations between branches and philosophical 
views. Second, it should be noted that the prompts in the STEM instrument are not validated 
using psychometric techniques. Their original purpose is to promote dialogue among 
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collaborators, and to this end, they occasionally embed vague or ambiguous terminology 
designed to tease out unacknowledged differences in conceptualization among collaborators 
during a dialogue structured by their responses to these prompts. For example, Reality 4 
includes the term “human construction,” which allows for multiple interpretations. A 
sociologist might agree with this prompt, thinking the subject of their research (e.g., 
government, money) would not exist without humans, while an engineer might agree with it 
thinking that the subject of their research (e.g., bridges) are constructed by humans. Further 
research designed to build on these preliminary findings should seek to collect attitude data 
with prompts that are immune to this sort of concern.  
5.3 Experimental data, philosophy of science, and interdisciplinary integration 
We conclude our discussion by considering several implications our results have for 
integration in philosophy of science, and especially interdisciplinary integration. 
Interdisciplinarity is a “powerful trend in contemporary science” (Mäki 2016, 328) that 
involves the integration of distinct disciplinary explanations, data, standards, and methods 
(Brigandt 2013). This type of integration is also recognized as a key part of responses to the 
“Grand Challenges” facing humanity (Grandis and Efstathiou 2016).19 As such, it is a topic that 
                                               
19 For example, an interdisciplinary account of the risks posed by geoengineering, such 
as solar radiation management projects, would require the synthesis, or integration, of inputs 
from the earth sciences, sociology, economics, and philosophy (Tuana et al. 2012). Although 
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has garnered increased attention from philosophers of science, especially those interested in 
interdisciplinarity, biology, or cognitive science (Bermúdez 2010; Brigandt 2010, 2013; 
Griesemer 2013; Grune-Yanoff 2016; Holbrook 2013; Leonelli 2013; O’Rourke, Crowley, and 
Gonnerman 2016; O’Rourke 2017). 
Our empirical work positions us to make three contributions to the philosophical 
understanding of interdisciplinary integration in the sciences. Each can be seen as contributing 
to the philosophical task described by Brigandt: “to understand what [integration] involves, 
how integrative practices operate, how integrative accounts are formed, and what the 
challenges and limits to integration are” (2013, 461–62) . First, although philosophy can profit 
from the interaction of different disciplines in interdisciplinary research (Crowley, 
Gonnerman, and O’Rourke 2016), we have argued that philosophy can also be a source of 
conceptual differences that challenge interdisciplinary integration (Eigenbrode et al. 2007). 
Our work serves as an empirical contribution to the task of better understanding what this 
challenge looks like in particular collaborative contexts. Specifically, our findings reveal some 
of the contours of an emerging map of philosophical attitudes about science. While parts of the 
map remain obscured, our results indicate that social and behavioral scientists differ 
                                               
interdisciplinary research does not require collaboration, it is often collaborative due to the 
need for a rich variety of inputs and a sensitivity to the range of disciplinary constraints on 
integration. 
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methodologically from biophysical scientists in several ways (Methodology 1-4). They are also 
inclined to be suspicious of the value-free ideal (Values 3), naïve realism about the external 
world (Realism 4), and objectivity as a regulative ideal (Realism 1 & 2). Biophysical scientists 
differ among themselves in terms of how reliant they are on experimentation (Confirmation 
3). It is reasonable that these differences represent specific differences among branches of 
science. Interdisciplinary teams that include representatives of these scientific branches may 
need to negotiate these differences if their collaboration is going to function well (Lélé and 
Norgaard 2005). The methodological differences may appear unsurprising, they are not trivial 
in the context of interdisciplinary research teams trying to develop an integrated methodology. 
Navigating the differences can often become quite challenging (Eigenbrode et al. 2007; 
O’Rourke and Crowley 2013). The same can be said for the value-neutral ideal. It can’t be 
determined prima facie which differences will be trivial or formidable in the life of an 
interdisciplinary research team.  
A second point that our empirical work positions us to make about interdisciplinary 
integration relates to the challenge of integrating across the natural science/social science 
divide (Barthel and Seidl 2017; Lélé and Norgaard 2005). According to Rylance, 
interdisciplinarity that attempts to integrate “distant” disciplines is “more complex to 
undertake” (2015, 314). As a first approximation, it is reasonable to take disciplines in the 
Social & Behavioral Sciences branch to be more “distant” from those in, say, the Life Sciences 
than any two disciplines in the Social Sciences or in the Life Sciences would be from one 
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another; this is suggested, after all, by their classification in different academic branches. Our 
results provide empirical support for this metric, highlighting a number of conceptual 
dimensions along which the social sciences differ from the natural sciences. When disciplines 
from these branches collaborate, the distance between how they conceptualize and practice 
science makes the common ground necessary to support interdisciplinary integration (Klein 
2012) more difficult to come by, which could explain why these collaborations are more 
complex. In no small part, how one tends to conceptualize and practice science is grounded in 
one’s philosophical attitudes about science, including one’s core beliefs about the nature of 
science and the world and differences in operative values about scientific practice. 
A third and more speculative point is that our results provide some reason to think that 
differences among the philosophical attitudes of scientists are not neatly partitioned into 
academic branches. There is considerable variability within branches—see the standard 
deviation values in Table 4 (Appendix)—suggesting that considerable differences in 
philosophical attitudes may exist within related disciplines. When we speak of interdisciplinary 
research projects, we talk about inter-disciplinary integration. But maybe discipline is best 
viewed as a proxy variable for a host of factors that individual researchers bring into the 
project. After all, scientists don’t integrate disciplines when engaging in interdisciplinary 
integration; rather, they integrate methods, data, or perspectives as practiced, supplied, or 
championed by individuals. They seek individual agreement with decisions that combine 
perspectives in complex, often sui generis ways (Klein 2012). Differences in core beliefs and 
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values, including those pertaining to science and its practice, may partition at the level of 
discipline in interesting ways, but it is also possible that in any collection of collaborators—
even those that might seem like “unidisciplinary” collaborations—the differences in core 
beliefs and values among the individuals represent obstacles to meaningful integration. So, in 
short, by focusing on disciplines in interdisciplinary integrations, we may be looking in the 
wrong place—perhaps the really important differences do not aggregate at the disciplinary 
level. 
6 Conclusion 
Our examination of Toolbox data revealed differences in how scientists from different 
branches of science reacted to philosophical claims about aspects of scientific practice. In total, 
these results suggest that distinctions among branches of science are correlated with interesting 
philosophical differences. These differences concern attitudes toward realism, objectivity, 
replication, values, hypotheses, and methods. Since our results are preliminary, further 
experimental research in the philosophy of science is warranted to explore the scope and nature 
of these differences, as well as the extent to which these differences are responsible for deeper 
differences among ways of practicing science.  
These results make two contributions to the burgeoning field of experimental 
philosophy of science. First, reflection on our results, and especially their bearing on recent 
work on scientific integration, provides an argument by example for the validity and 
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effectiveness of experimental philosophy of science. These results help to reinforce 
philosophical conclusions about scientific integration derived through non-experimental means 
(e.g., the claim that integration across the natural/social divide can be especially challenging 
to achieve). In this way, experimental philosophy of science can provide a line of converging 
evidence in support of extant views in philosophy of science. Second, our results show that 
experimental philosophy of science can also suggest insights into science that may be harder 
to gain through non-experimental means, e.g., that philosophical differences across individuals 
may be more of an obstacle to interdisciplinary integration than cross-disciplinary differences.  
 
 
Appendix 
  Comparison U p r 
Reality 1 
LS-PSM 4939 0.29 0.07 
LS-SBS* 4776.5 9.52 x 10-4 0.24 
PSM-SBS* 2432.5 0.03 0.20 
Reality 2 
LS-PSM 3351 0.07 0.13 
LS-SBS* 2364.5 3.79 x 10-4 0.26 
PSM-SBS 1469 0.08 0.16 
Reality 4 
LS-PSM 3409 0.69 0.03 
LS-SBS* 1698.5 2.70 x 10-9 0.43 
PSM-SBS* 875 2.90 x 10-6 0.42 
Confirmation 3 
LS-PSM 4888.5 0.54 0.04 
LS-SBS* 5309.5 1.42 x 10-5 0.31 
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PSM-SBS* 2656.5 0.002 0.27 
Values 3 
LS-PSM 4474.5 0.78 0.02 
LS-SBS* 4639 0.002 0.23 
PSM-SBS* 2586.5 0.006 0.24 
Methodology 1 
LS-PSM 4950 0.75 0.02 
LS-SBS* 4949 0.002 0.22 
PSM-SBS* 2627 0.009 0.23 
Methodology 2 
LS-PSM 4400.5 0.61 0.04 
LS-SBS* 5052 1.10 x 10-4 0.28 
PSM-SBS* 2648.5 3.99 x 10-4 0.31 
Methodology 3 
LS-PSM 4352 0.78 0.02 
LS-SBS* 2109.5 3.87 x 10-7 0.36 
PSM-SBS* 1170 5.91 x 10-5 0.35 
Methodology 4 
LS-PSM* 5472.5 0.01 0.18 
LS-SBS* 5880 2.00 x 10-11 0.47 
PSM-SBS* 2733.5 1.37 x 10-5 0.38 
Table 3. Summary of results for the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon (MWW) test for the nine 
prompts suggested for further analysis by the Kruskal–Wallis tests. Comparisons marked in 
bold and with asterisks show significant differences.  
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Table 4. Summary of means and standard deviation by prompt 
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